

# **Exercise SULA**

**National Contingency Plan Exercise  
18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> May 2011**



**The Northern Gannet (SULA) - Morus Bassanus**

## **Exercise Report**

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## 1.0 Foreword

The explosion and subsequent sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig over the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico April 2010 was both a human and environmental tragedy which caused the offshore oil and gas industry, and those who regulate it, worldwide to pause and look closely at their practises, processes and procedures.

The UK was no exception and whilst our regulatory regime is already among the most robust in the world and the industry's track record in the North Sea is strong we committed to learn everything we could from the Macondo incident. The UK regulatory bodies are working closely with the offshore oil and gas industry to ensure that any lessons are understood, effectively communicated and implemented by companies working in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS).

In the UK all activities which could potentially impact on the environment are subject to rigorous assessment but there is never room for complacency. Exercise SULA forms part of an established programme of response exercises undertaken by the regulators and the industry to make sure that everyone involved is as prepared as possible in the event of a real incident.

Exercise SULA in May 2011 played out a scenario testing the UK's National Contingency Plan (NCP) for marine pollution from a deepwater drilling operation, similar to Macondo. With over 200 participants, Exercise SULA examined the UK's combined response capabilities by bringing together all the major organisations who would participate in the containment, at-sea response and shoreline response efforts to minimise the impact of a major pollution incident.

The exercise demonstrated that the UK has highly professional and dedicated personnel who understand their roles and responsibilities and who can respond effectively. As could be expected with any well planned and tested scenario, the exercise highlighted some areas for improvement and identified a number of learning points which can be directly applied in future.

The Exercise Directors thank all those involved, recognising the hard work and dedication demonstrated by both the planning team, who pulled the Exercise together, and those who participated in bringing the Exercise to a successful conclusion.

Philip Naylor  
Director of Maritime Services  
Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Wendy Kennedy  
Head, Offshore Environment and  
Decommissioning Unit  
Department of Energy & Climate Change

## **2.0 Acknowledgments**

A number of agencies and individuals contributed to the successful planning and execution of Exercise SULA. The exercise planning team would like to record the essential contribution made by individuals from the following organisations:

Maritime and Coastguard Agency  
Department of Energy and Climate Change  
Marine Scotland  
Shetland Islands Council  
Chevron Upstream Europe  
Oil Spill Response  
Petrofac Training  
Morlich Services Limited

A special note of thanks to Chevron Upstream Europe for agreeing to play the Operator for the exercise.

The planning team would also like to acknowledge the funding provided in support of the exercise by Oil and Gas UK.

Special thanks to Lisa McAuliffe (MCA), Pete Thomson (MCA), Donna McLean (Moray Council), Neil Golding (JNCC) and Oil Spill Response for the photographs.

### **3.0 Executive Summary**

Exercise SULA was the first major national exercise to incorporate all aspects of the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations (NCP), involving the establishment of the various response cells dealing with onshore and offshore issues and incorporating Government bodies, local councils and the offshore oil and gas industry.

The rationale to test the response system was as a direct result of the Deepwater Horizon incident, the planning for deepwater drilling operations West of Shetland and following correspondence between the First Minister of Scotland and the Prime Minister.

The aim of the exercise was to test the United Kingdom's (UK) response to a major oil spill resulting from a deepwater offshore drilling incident within the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) similar to that experienced in the Gulf of Mexico during April 2010.

The exercise scenario involved an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from a deepwater well over a prolonged period of time which would impact upon the Shetland Isles within 8 – 10 days. This scenario was played out over a two day period - Wednesday 18 and Thursday 19 May 2011.

Day one of the exercise was designed to test the initial response procedures of each organisation to a significant offshore pollution event while day two of the exercise had the timeline advanced five days and was designed to test the shoreline response effort as well as resourcing a prolonged pollution incident.

A physical deployment of pollution response equipment also took place in Sullom Voe, Shetland, on May 19, 2011 as part of the DECC requirement for offshore oil and gas operators to demonstrate the deployment of Tier 2/3 oil response equipment by accredited contractors every five years. This physical deployment was a separate exercise and is not addressed in this report.

Twelve groups, each with their own pre determined areas of responsibility were observed and evaluated during the exercise using pre agreed success criteria. The major participants in the exercise were the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Chevron (Upstream Europe), the Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP), Shetland Islands Council (SIC) and the Scottish Standing Environment Group (EG).

The initial response by all those involved in the exercise was in accordance with laid down practices and procedures with all relevant organisations being informed and responding appropriately. Assessments of the potential pollution impact were quickly and correctly identified and appropriate resources tasked to respond with short, medium and long term response requirements being addressed.

Response cells were correctly established as detailed within the NCP and communications between the cells initiated. Some of the cells experienced communications difficulties and these are covered in the main report.

Short, medium and long term response strategies were developed for monitoring, containing, recovering and disposing of the pollution by Chevron as required in their Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (OPEP) and communicated with the other response authorities.

The interaction between Chevron and the Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP) was considered "first class" and allowed full presentation of specific capping and relief well strategies.

There was some discussion between the Environment Group and other response cells on the authorisation and appropriate use of dispersants on day one which identified some underlying uncertainty with the current procedures.

Initially individual roles and responsibilities were fully understood and in line with expectations. However in some cases these roles and responsibilities became less clearly defined following the change of status from Tier 2 to Tier 3 and the consequential role of the MRC as overall co-ordinator. This led to a duplication of effort with regards the overall response strategy between the MRC and Chevron Asset Emergency Management Team (AEMT).

During day one the involvement of the Shoreline Response Centre and Shetland Islands Council was limited whilst information was gathered and a fuller picture developed. This involvement increased on day two following the time line advance.

Following analysis of evaluators, controllers, players and observers comments the exercise planning team considered the exercise was a success and that the UK pollution response system could effectively respond to a deepwater offshore drilling incident.

The exercise planning team felt that Exercise SULA effectively tested the larger UK response system, the NCP and individual response organisations. More importantly it identified a number of key learning points which, once addressed, will enhance the overall UK pollution response system.

The most salient learning point from the exercise was the need to ensure that all responders are clear about their overall roles and responsibilities, and that these are clearly defined within the NCP. A full list of recommendations is detailed at Appendix A with observations detailed at Appendix B.

A recommendation monitoring group will be established to oversee how the recommendations are actioned. This was identified as good practice following the previous National Exercise – Exercise Unicorn. The team will consist of representatives from MCA and DECC with other organisations co-opted as and when applicable. It is recommended that the recommendations monitoring group will also act as advisors during the rewrite of the National Contingency Plan.


## 4.0 Introduction

Exercise SULA was a live multi-agency emergency response exercise designed to test the United Kingdom National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations.

Both MCA and DECC were determined to ensure that lessons identified from the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico were learned and incorporated into their procedures to improve the offshore and onshore response capabilities. Government was therefore keen to demonstrate that both the UK Government and offshore industry were capable of responding, and that agreed counter pollution measures were appropriate and capable of effectively dealing with such an incident.

The exercise was conducted in real time over two days on Wednesday 18 and Thursday 19 May 2011. It incorporated a number of elements of both onshore and offshore counter pollution response, well control and containment, functioning at the operational, tactical and strategic levels within different organisations.

Principally, the focus of the exercise was in the vicinity of an offshore oil and gas facility in West of Shetland. A number of onshore locations were also involved.



(OSR aircraft spraying in Sullom Voe)

(Incident location)

## **5.0 Exercise Overall Aim**

The aim was to exercise the UK's response to a major oil spill resulting from a deepwater offshore drilling incident within the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) similar to that experienced in the Gulf of Mexico during April 2010.

## 6.0 Exercise Participants


The exercise incorporated a significant counter pollution element. The participating organisations and companies are listed below. People or agencies **not** listed below were role-played from onshore or offshore locations.

- Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
- Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
- Chevron Upstream Europe (CUE)
- Marine Scotland (MS)
- Shetland Islands Council (SIC)
- Shetland Islands Council Ports and Harbor's
- Oil Spill Response (OSR)
- Sullom Voe Terminal, BP (SVT)
- Briggs Environmental Services (BESL)
- Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH)
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)
- Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC)
- Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
- Stena Drilling
- Hess Ltd
- BP Exploration Operating Company Limited
- Braemar Howells
- Wild Well Control (WWC)
- Neptune Subsea Engineering
- Oceaneering
- ASCO Freight Management
- Craig Industrial Supplies
- Support Companies
- Vessel Operators

## 7.0 National Contingency Plan

### 7.1 Purpose of the National Contingency Plan

The purpose of the National Contingency Plan is to ensure that there is a timely, measured and effective response to maritime incidents. The owners and masters of ships and the operators of offshore installations bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that they do not pollute the sea. Harbour authorities are likewise responsible for ensuring that their ports operate in a manner that avoids marine pollution and for responding to incidents within their limits. However, ships, offshore installations and harbour authorities may face problems which exceed the response capabilities they can reasonably maintain, and in these circumstances the MCA may need to use national assets in the response to a marine pollution incident.



The National Contingency Plan sets out the circumstances in which the MCA deploys the UK's national assets to respond to a marine pollution incident to protect the overriding public interest.

### 7.2 Implementation

MCA, an Executive Agency of the Department for Transport (DfT), has overall responsibility for the implementation of the NCP. For this purpose, MCA exercises the functions of the Secretary of State for Transport under the 1995 Merchant Shipping Act, including the Secretary of State's intervention powers.

Regulations under the Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999 created parallel powers for the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in relation to offshore installations and pipelines.

In reality, the Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP) empowered to act in relation to shipping and offshore installations is the same person. In the absence of the SOSREP, designated personnel are empowered to exercise the SOSREP's powers.

The Government has appointed the SOSREP to provide overall direction for salvage, intervention and the prevention of marine pollution incidents involving ships or offshore installations which require a national response. The normal arrangement is therefore for the SOSREP to exercise operational control. As recommended in the late Lord Donaldson of Lymington's report on Salvage and Intervention and their Command and Control, Ministers and senior officials should not attempt to influence SOSREP's operational decisions while operations are in progress. In his words, they should "back him or sack him".

**The SOSREP role does not include any responsibility for either at-sea or shoreline cleanup activities.**

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Section 2, places a duty upon Category 1 responders to prevent an emergency, reduce, control or mitigate its effects, in relation to their functions and take any other action in connection with it. Local authorities are Category 1 responders and are required to prepare and implement local response plans based on this requirement.



(OSR aircraft spraying in Sullom Voe)

## 8.0 Exercise Scenario

For exercise purposes a simulated incident took place in an area West of Shetland. Participants responded from a number of locations including, but not limited to; Aberdeen and the Shetland Islands.


**Location:** Cambo Field  
**Block:** 204/10 (UK)  
**Lat/Long:** 60° 49' North, 004° 07' West  
**Water Depth:** 1,090 metres  
**Distance from Shetland:** 86 miles

## 8.1 Operation

The Cambo discovery potentially spans Blocks 204/4, 204/5, 204/9 and 204/10 of the UKCS. Three previous wells have been drilled (one exploration and two appraisal wells) and the well being drilled was the fourth in the Cambo area. The primary objective of this appraisal well (204/10a-D) was to confirm commercial reservoir deliverability by undertaking a conventional well test. The activity consisted of a slightly deviated pilot hole, followed by a horizontal main bore into the reservoir.

Sidetrack True Vertical Depth Subsea: 2,310 metres  
Sidetrack length: 3,521 metres

### Location of the proposed Cambo 4 well



## 8.2 Stena Carron Drill Ship

The well was being drilled using the dynamically positioned drillship *Stena Carron*. This is a sixth generation drill ship which is rated to work in water depths up to 10,000ft and is on long-term contract with Chevron from Stena Drilling. The rig has already proved herself in the harsh environments in the North Atlantic margin area, previously drilling four wells successfully in 3,500 – 4,000ft of water. The rig has a UK Safety Case, allowing operations in UK waters, and is Class certified. Critical systems for ensuring well containment are the dynamic positioning (DP) system, riser and riser tensioning systems, subsea blow out prevention equipment, surface blow out prevention equipment, drilling fluid circulating and processing systems.



(*Stena Carron* Drill Ship)

Cambo Crude Oil Properties (similar to Foinaven)

Oil Property	Value
Specific gravity	0.902
API gravity	25°
Asphaltene content	0.09% wt
Wax content	8.0%
Pour point	9 degrees Celsius
ITOPF Classification	Group 3

## 8.3 Operational status prior to incident

The *Stena Carron* was on day 98 of the program. The well had been drilled to the required depth and 4.5” production tubing and Subsurface Test Tree had been installed. The main conductor was in place with a Blowout Preventor (BOP) attached and a Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) attached to the top of the BOP connecting a 1000 metre riser to the surface and onto the *Stena Carron*. A heave compensator on the vessel managed the vertical and horizontal movement of the riser to allow operations to continue uninterrupted by adverse weather.

The vessel was on day three of the well test flow (rate of 6,000 barrels of oil per day (BOPD) recorded – unconstrained 10,000 BOPD) with all fluids flared off. An inspection Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) had been deployed and was undertaking routine inspection work at the BOP.

Persons On Board (POB) the Stena Carron: 138


*Vos Endurance* Emergency Response and Recovery Vessel (ERRV) is stationed within the 500 metre exclusion zone.



(ERRV - *Vos Endurance*)

Weather	Next 8 hours
Wind Direction:	335 °
Wind Speed (knots):	35
Cloud base (feet):	8,000
Sea State:	4 – 5 metres
Sea Temperature degrees c:	8
Air Temperature degrees c:	9
Visibility miles:	11 miles
Notes:	Threat of squalls

## 8.4 Status prior to incident



## 8.5 Incident Scenario

At 7.30am the deck crew noticed a hydraulic problem with the heave compensator and draw works which had significantly reduced its performance capability. A maintenance crew were dispatched and began working on the problem whilst a new operational temporary threshold was introduced. The weather was just within the revised performance parameters.


At 8.00am a squall hit the vessel. The maintenance crew were still working on the compensator with no resolution to the problem. The OIM assessed the situation and decided to disconnect and move off station. Upon instruction by the OIM the DP operator activated the DP 'RED' alarm. This alarm prompts the driller to activate the Emergency Disconnect Sequence (EDS), which automatically shears the landing string and unlatches the LMRP from the BOP.

The marine riser was successfully unlatched at the LMRP/BOP interface, allowing the *Stena Carron* to move away from the wellhead.

The casing shear rams sheared the production string above the Subsea Test Tree (SSTT). However, the SSTT failed to close and the blind shear rams did not create an effective seal (reason unknown) which resulted in a significant ongoing leak of hydrocarbons into the sea. The eyeball ROV, which was in the water at the time of departure, observed the failure of the BOP confirming large quantities of oil leaking from the production tubing emanating from the top of the BOP. Footage is recorded for approximately one minute before the ROV is pulled off station and recovered to the surface. The ROV is deployed later in the exercise to attempt to manually shut in the tree however all efforts are unsuccessful.

**Situation after incident:**

1. Uncontrolled ongoing release of hydrocarbons into the sea from the leaking blind shear rams (rate estimated between 2,000-4,000 BOPD). It will take 80 days for the flow of the well to naturally deplete.
2. Due to suspected contamination in the hydraulic system, the draw works and heave compensation system are temporarily non-operational rendering the *Stena Carron* disabled and the drill floor inoperable, with 3700 ft of marine riser and the LMRP suspended beneath the vessel. It will take approximately two days to de-oil the riser and flare the contents. During that time the vessel was unable to manoeuvre into shallow water and was required to determine an appropriate action regarding the recovery / release of the riser. The suspected contamination in the hydraulic system rendered the vessel unavailable for well related works requiring it to return to the port for repairs.



## 9.0 Evaluation Process

Eight organisations submitted objectives for the exercise and a total of eleven cells / groups were initially identified for evaluation. A further group was identified during the exercise and subsequently added to the overall report.

The following groups were evaluated during the exercise:

- Chevron Asset Emergency Management Team (AEMT)
- Chevron Technical Response Group
- Chevron Legal and Finance Team
- Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
- Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP)
- MCA, Marine Response Centre (MRC)
- Shoreline Response Centre (SRC)
- Shetland Islands Council (SIC)
- Sullom Voe Terminal (BP)
- Oil Spill Response (OSR)
- Environment Group (EG)
- Media Response

Cell / group evaluators were selected for their expertise and knowledge in a particular field as well as their knowledge of pollution and emergency response procedures in general. (A list of evaluators is detailed in Appendix G).

This expertise and knowledge was key in ensuring that there was a full and accurate evaluation on how response cells / groups and individuals reacted and whether respective roles and responsibilities were fulfilled.

Following a review of previous exercises and identifying good practice a set of evaluation areas were developed along with criteria within these areas for each group.

Where applicable these evaluation areas and assessment criteria were specifically generic and applied to all groups to enable across the board analysis. In those groups with specialist evaluation areas bespoke assessment criteria were developed.

A separate set of success criteria was also developed for each evaluation area to aid the evaluator.

Each evaluator was requested to comment on whether organisations objectives had been met. In some cases this was an assessment over two or more cells / groups whilst others could be assessed over one cell / group.

Following discussion with the evaluators it was agreed that the structure and format of the evaluation form enabled them to identify areas for assessment and comment accordingly.

Debriefs were held with each cell / group at the end of each day and the information was fed into the evaluation process.

The following areas were identified for evaluation:

<b>Evaluation Area</b>	<b>Cells Evaluated</b>
Initial Alert	All
Initial action	All
Establishment of Response Cell and Initial Response Strategy	All
Airborne Response	Chevron AEMT, OSR, MRC, EG
At Sea Response	Chevron AEMT, OSR, MRC, EG
SRC Management Team	SRC
SRC Technical Team	SRC
SRC Procurement Team	SRC
OCU Meeting	OCU
On Going Response Strategy	All
Logistics/Finance.	All
Communications	All
Teamwork	All
Security	All
Handover (if appropriate)	All

## 10.0 Evaluation Summaries

*The following are summaries compiled by the author of each evaluator's comments and incorporating feedback from the debrief sessions, observers, players and controllers.*

### 10.1 Exercise Planning Team

#### What Went Well

No personnel were injured during the exercise and there was no damage to property.

The scope and objectives of the exercise were clearly identified for the key exercise participants and became critical in forming the basis for the performance measurements.

All the key agencies that would be involved in this scenario were successfully engaged and well represented in the exercise.

The essential component parts associated with the planning process were identified and the necessary sub groups established to work through the activities.

The scenario and timeframe was realistic and engaged the entire exercise community.

The documentation produced fully supported all elements of the exercise and ensured that the role-played, and artificial, elements interfaced where appropriate with live play.

Assessing the performance of the participants was successfully captured utilising pre-prepared specific response cell measurement criteria and appropriately experienced Evaluators.

The format for "Day 2" of the exercise proved successful in occupying the teams for the required time period and fulfilling the performance expectations.

The exercise was well executed with clear command and control arrangements in place and communication pathways for exercise directing staff and evaluators.

The debrief process developed for participants and the planning team proved successful in capturing the critical points and allowing the planning team to ensure the exercise ran in alignment with the objectives.

The Planning Team contained the appropriate level of expertise to ensure all elements of the exercise were adequately prepared with good leadership and support provided from the joint chair

No adverse NGO activity was recorded.

### **Less Effective**

For an exercise of this nature a longer lead in time would have provided the planning team with a better opportunity to work through the relevant elements in more detail.

Whilst many of the planning team members had previously participated in exercises, there was initially minimal combined experience and expertise available when planning the execution processes with no apparent model implemented or followed.

Careful selection of the planning team is required to ensure that only the necessary personnel are selected and that potential players are not included.

Establishing at the beginning of the planning process the associated administration to include: empowered and engaged leadership, clear inter-team communication pathways and protocols and effective tools for project management.

Early recognition of the necessary funding is required to ensure timely engagement of the appropriate planning resources.

The ability for the team to determine the level of participation expected from participants to ensure the necessary elements are tested.

The planning team were unaware of the lack of a pollution response MOU with the Danish Authorities in the Faeroe Islands, which led to an unachievable objective.

## 10.2 Chevron Upstream Europe Asset Emergency Management Team (AEMT)

### Overall Objectives – Applicable to AEMT and Technical Response Group only

1. To exercise the expanded Asset Emergency Management Team (AEMT) for a major well control and oil pollution incident per Emergency Response Plan.
2. To exercise well control and oil pollution response plans as detailed in the Onshore and Offshore Oil Pollution Emergency Plans (OPEP's).
3. Exercise Chevron AEMT interface and liaison within a National Contingency Plan response.
4. Exercise Chevron media interface within a National Contingency Plan response.

The evaluators considered that all of the objectives set by Chevron had been met.

### **What Went Well**

The initial alerting of Chevron to the incident was considered good and the incident commander quickly took control and briefed his team members accordingly. Initial actions were quickly identified and appropriate plans and procedures implemented and followed. A representative from Chevron was despatched to Aberdeen Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre to act as a liaison officer with HM Coastguard.

The Emergency Response Room (ERR) is a dedicated facility within Chevron House designed to co-ordinate the initial emergency response. Once it was established that this was a significant ongoing pollution incident, Chevron's internal procedures were followed and resulted in a smooth transition from the ERR to the AEMT response rooms. The transfer of locations did not impact on Chevron's initial and long term response.

The Incident Commander took time to visit and introduce himself to each of the response teams, located, at other venues, within Chevron House.

A number of sub teams were set up to respond to the incident. The heads of each sub team gave situation briefs during AEMT assessment meetings. These meetings were well managed and allowed team heads to identify strategic priorities and discuss tactical issues. The need for continuous safe operations was emphasised at all meetings and taken as a priority.

The AEMT initial strategy for both the airborne and at sea response was quickly identified as detailed within their OPEP, and appropriate resources sourced through their Tier 2/3 responder which included discussion on the possible use of dispersants.



(Chevron AMET Meeting)

The use of display boards was developed over the two days to enable an overall picture of activity to be created. These display boards were used effectively. To compliment these boards a 'zone of operation' chart was displayed.

Full legal and financial sub teams were established by Chevron and fed into the AEMT. Processes and procedures for financial support of the incident and external claims were initiated quickly and developed during the exercise.

Internal communications within Chevron worked well with no significant challenges identified other than those around IT. External communications between cells was enhanced by the deployment of liaison officers.

The teamwork within Chevron was effective, led by an Incident Commander, supported by a Deputy Incident Commander. Tactical and strategic objectives were clearly identified and explained to the team. Briefings were timely and conducted in a focused manner allowing everyone an input.

The use of different coloured tabards to differentiate the sub groups eased identification.

Over the period of the exercise the increasingly complex number of concurrent issues, coupled with the assessment briefings, were managed effectively.

Access to all cells within Chevron House was through a number of security layers and no breaches were reported.

A Well Control Technical Section was established under a dedicated section chief with individual team leads developing and supporting implementation of each of the well control strategies.

### **Less Effective**

While the Incident Commander was visiting the response cells in Chevron House, the Deputy Incident Commander was briefing the DECC inspector upon arrival. This resulted in a brief period where there was no clearly identified leadership in the AEMT.

During the AEMT Assessment meetings there was uncertainty in relation to the MRC on roles and responsibilities and how this interface could be better managed. This became more apparent in relation to the co-ordination of the air and sea response when the MRC assumed the lead. This was as a result of lack of communication between cells and clarity within the NCP for offshore incidents. It was felt that co-locating the MRC at Chevron's offices, as happens with the OCU, would have allowed face to face communication which may have overcome much of this uncertainty.

### **Summary**

Overall the response to the incident from Chevron's AEMT was considered effective, in accordance with their OPEP and well led. There was good teamwork and an obvious commitment by Chevron to the exercise process. Unfortunately communications between Chevron AEMT and the MRC were unable to bring full clarity to the roles and responsibilities assumed by the MRC upon taking the lead and what was expected of Chevron.

## **10.3 Chevron Upstream Europe Technical Response Group (TG)**

### **What Went Well**

The Technical Group Leader (TGL) was briefed by the AEMT Incident Commander and the subsequent brief of the Technical Group Team was accurate with the opportunity for the team to ask for clarification. During the initial brief the TGL assigned tasks to different individuals.

Blow out response plans were immediately available and additional copies were printed out for Wild Well Control (WWC). The blow out response plans included six streams (ROV intervention/debris removal; well capping; well kill operation; subsea dispersant; relief well and containment) and these were arranged for ease of reference.

There was a full and appropriate initial response to the situation as it developed, with future plans being devised.

Chevrons initial actions were to mobilise and deploy their own capping stack and to identify the condition of the BOP rams. To implement these actions Chevron liaised effectively with WWC, Oceaneering and Neptune personnel.

Internal tracking forms were used effectively and a good discipline developed in timing actions and progress. These were monitored on the established baseline plan which was used to present progress at assessment and OCU meetings.

There was good assignment of roles and responsibilities with clear instructions given by the TGL to identify personnel to lead the update of different sections of the baseline plan.

All appropriate material for assessing the technical response was available. An appointed focal point kept the team supplied with additional copies of technical documents as required.

Appropriate risk assessments were carried out for all operations and the TGL always made safety a priority.

There was an ongoing identification and consideration of the environmental and business impacts of the response through various pre-session meetings.

There was good co-ordination between the Technical Group and Logistics Group via the identified focal point.

Verbal communications within the team were excellent and, with the introduction of time out sessions on day two, the team felt they were well informed and part of the decision making process.

There were several good examples of liaison between the Technical Group Team and the Logistics and Planning Team. This was due to the frequency and quality of communications with other company response teams and was established by the assessment report, which recorded key decisions; out meetings and update sessions.

It was clear from the beginning who was in charge of the Technical Group. However the amount of time spent by the TGL at meetings meant a deputy was required and therefore this position was created. Thereafter a deputy was assigned to manage pre-assessment meeting preparation and updates of the plan.

The style and delivery of key information was positive and well received by the team with clarification sought as and when required.

Most of the individuals involved were experts in their own right and much of the developing scenario was relevant to their normal day job. As such they required only limited direction and occasional co-ordination.

### **Less Effective**

Electronic communications were not fully effective within the Technical Group location with some mobile phones not working and contractors unable to access the internet to view response procedures. This was rectified by day two but was a major hindrance during day one.

The Technical Group location was not ideal as it was close to the general reception; the blanking of windows was effective although, unlike other groups, there was no official internal security to limit access to the room.

### **Summary**

The overall effectiveness of the Technical Group was good and all appropriate contingencies identified and developed. The team dynamic was considered to be good with excellent overall leadership. Key decisions were properly recorded and good use made of pre-established blow out response plans. The development of a baseline plan ensured good monitoring and forward planning. There were some issues with IT communications on day one and the physical location of the group. However these challenges were overcome in a professional manner and although frustrating, did not adversely affect the response.

## 10.4 Chevron Upstream Europe Legal and Financial Team

Objectives: No overall specific objective were set for this team.

### **What Went Well**

The Chevron finance and legal team were established early on day one and were involved in the Chevron AEMT meetings.

The need for an independent third party claims handler was identified and engaged; funds were set in place with a free telephone and website claims notification process established.

Consideration was made as to who would appoint an independent assessor to ensure transparency and independence, particularly in the latter stages where claims may be more complex. It was identified that a third party claims handler would prioritise hardship claims. A high priority was to ensure contact was established between the claims handler and the Scottish Fisherman's Federation to assist with fishermen hardship cases.

It was recognised that strict liability was established through membership of the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL).

The need to ensure Chevron's insurers were advised of actions taken was identified as an important issue. Self insurance is significant as there is a requirement to pay hardship claims quickly therefore systems need to be in place to allow this. Release letters are required to be signed as part of the settlement for any hardship claims to record receipt of funds and confirmation from the applicant that this is not a fraudulent claim.

No absolute waivers were executed at this stage to avoid pressure on claimants. The full claim would be analysed in due course and only at that stage would a full and final settlement waiver be signed, if appropriate.

Early discussion with the Shetland Islands Council Legal Team was undertaken.

Chevron Legal Team was engaged throughout.

Twenty, forty and sixty day scenarios were developed along with a worst case requirement for two relief wells.

### **Less Effective**

Nothing identified.

**Summary**

It was felt that Chevron took a very proactive approach to ensuring reasonable claims would be dealt with quickly and independently. Establishment of a local office using an independent third party was considered a priority. The agreement of a threshold for quick claim payment to cover reasonable costs was also a priority.

## 10.5 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)

### Overall Objectives

1. Test the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution.
2. Ensure an integrated approach is achieved between DECC, MCA and other stakeholders in responding to a major pollution incident.
3. Exercise the Chevron Well Control Plan.
4. Test the DECC media response, including liaison and deployment with MCA media personnel.
5. Lessons identified from Exercise SULA will be shared with Oil and Gas UK members as detailed within the Guidance Note to operators of Oil and Gas installations on the Merchant Shipping (Oil Preparedness, Response and Co-operation Convention) Regulations 1998.

The evaluators considered that all but two of the objectives set by DECC had been met.

4 – *(Media response covered by separate evaluation – See Section 10.11)*

5 – *(Sharing lessons learned still to be fully completed)*

### **What Went Well**

Full and additional information was obtained by the DECC Duty Inspector as per the procedures detailed within the DECC Incident Response Manual. This information was thereafter assessed and contact made with DECC Senior Managers, DECC Incident Response Coordinator and the MCA Duty Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer.

Following discussion it was determined the trigger point for alerting the SOSREP had been reached and the SOSREP was subsequently briefed.

A DECC Incident Notification Report was drafted and circulated to Senior Managers as per the DECC Incident Response Manual.

Due to the nature of the incident the DECC Duty Inspector and an additional DECC Inspector mobilised to Chevron's Emergency Response Room (ERR) to gain further information and to prepare for the potential establishment of the Operations Control Unit (OCU).

The deployment of two Inspectors allowed the Duty Inspector to assume the role of Assistant to the SOSREP, once the OCU was established, whilst the additional Inspector remained within Chevron's ERR to monitor the developing situation and provide updates to the SOSREP, and others, as required.

**Less Effective**

Nothing identified.

**Summary**

The DECC response was in line with their Incident Response Manual procedures and a high level of support was given to the SOSREP in both the initial and subsequent elements of the exercise.

## **10.6 Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP)**

### Overall Objectives

1. To exercise the SOSREP function within Government in relation to a major incident involving an offshore installation.
2. To establish an Operations Control Unit (OCU) in accordance with the National Contingency Plan and in relation to a major incident involving an offshore installation.
3. To exercise interaction between the Operations Control Unit and other maritime and participating land based response cells during a major incident response
4. To exercise cross government communications in relation to significant pollution from an offshore installation

The evaluators considered that all of the objectives set by the SOSREP for the OCU had been met.

### **What Went Well**

The initial alerting and subsequent briefing of the SOSREP was relevant and the decision was taken to establish an OCU. This information was communicated to Chevron and the DECC administrative support team deployed to Chevron House as detailed in Chevron's OPEP.

An Independent Technical Advisor for the SOSREP was co-located with Chevrons Technical Response Group. He was able to provide technical clarity to the SOSREP and other members of the OCU as appropriate.

As per the NCP there was appropriate representation from the operators and other bodies in the OCU.

Notification of the OCU being established was quickly communicated to the other response cells by utilising the Cell Activation form.

The Operator Representative(s) gave an informed overview of the current situation as well as an in depth presentation on their current and future plans for the SOSREP's consideration.

A standing agenda template was used which gave structure and focus to the meeting. Accurate minutes were taken which highlighted clearly agreed individual actions and, where appropriate, recorded SOSREP's decisions on the pollution containment response.

A 'Head of Cells' meeting was initiated to allow dissemination of information between cells which was found to be efficient and effective with a timetable being initiated by the SOSREP to allow these meetings to align with OCU, AEMT and other meetings.

DECC administrative support staff maintained a spreadsheet of internal resources being used for future cost recovery purposes. They were also able to identify suitable staff to support the OCU and SOSREP in the event of a prolonged incident.

Communications equipment utilised by the SOSREP, DECC and the Environment Group Liaison officer worked well.



(OCU Chevron House)

The SOSREP and OCU effectively monitored the operator's control and containment response.

The DECC support team, Inspectors and Administrators, successfully completed a full team handover procedure between day one and day two.

Access into the OCU was controlled by the Room Manger and in conjunction with the security provisions at Chevron House provided a safe and secure working area.

### **Less Effective**

Some evidence of poor communication, transfer of information, and collation between OCU liaison officers and the operator was observed. It was felt that this perceived lack of communications could have been partially overcome by OCU liaison officers being more proactive in communicating pertinent information. It was unclear whether OCU liaison officers were fully familiar with what was expected of them.

It was thought beneficial for OCU liaison officers to attend operators break out groups / response cells where appropriate, provided it did not interfere with their support of the SOSREP and the OCU. One example of this is the Environment Group, who reported that minimal information was being given to them or sought from them. In these circumstances cells should pro-actively communicate with their OCU liaison officer, to ensure effective communication is taking place.

A key factor in briefing Ministers' is the agreement on lines to take between the Government organisations. It was noted that difficulty was experienced obtaining these from the MRC.

The MCA Liaison Officer and HM Coastguard Liaison Officer needed to use their own personal laptop computers to access e-mail and the internet.

It was also noted that SOSREP's Strategic Advisors role included not only security of supply issues but also media and ministerial briefing responsibility. It was felt that this should be made more apparent when introducing the position to allow others to understand and communicate with this key role.

Although it was considered that the briefings provided by Chevron to the SOSREP was effective it would have been beneficial to use more visual aids such as drawings and maps. It would also have been beneficial to provide incident logs and operational plans between meetings. The provision of appropriate documentation was noted to have improved on day two.

Lack of minutes from the Head of Cells Meeting.

### **Summary**

The establishment of the OCU was efficient and provided a highly effective forum for Chevron to present their source control plans to the SOSREP. Meetings were run by the SOSREP in a controlled and effective manner utilising well established practises and procedures. The administrative support supplied by DECC ensured accurate records of proceedings were maintained and regular situation reports issued by the SOSREP informed other responders of current and future plans relating to source control.

Although there to support the SOSREP, better communications between the respective liaison officers and their established response cells may have helped to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the command and control of the at sea pollution cleanup response.

## 10.7 Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)

### Marine Response Centre (MRC)

#### Overall Objectives

1. Test the integration of aerial activities with industry.
2. Test the integration of at sea response activities with industry.
3. Trial vessel of opportunity configuration.
4. Review command and control links between the OCU, MRC, SRC and the Environment Group.
5. Test liaison and information dissemination on a National and International basis incorporating NORBRIT and BONN agreements.
6. Test the MOU with the Danish Authorities in the Faeroe Islands.

The evaluators considered that three of the objectives set by the MCA for the MRC had been fully met (1-3), two partially met (4 and 5) and one not met (6).

4 - Review command and control links between the OCU, MRC, SRC and the Environment Group was not fully met due to poor communications and uncertainty over command and control.

5 - Test liaison and information dissemination on a National and International basis incorporating the NORBRIT and BONN Agreements was not fully met due to poor communications.

6 - Test the MOU with the Danish Authorities (Faeroe Islands) was not met as there was a mistaken assumption by the original planning team that there was an MOU for pollution response.

#### **What Went Well**

The initial alerting information was received and appropriate internal and external authorities informed as per procedures. Information and decisions fully recorded by the MCA Duty Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer (CPSO).

The initial briefing was given by the Duty CPSO to the head of the cell / controlling officer. The Duty CPSO then briefed the rest of the MRC. The initial pollution status was considered to be a Tier 2 response but it was recognised an escalation of the incident to Tier 3 would activate the NCP and possible deployment of MCA resources.

Personnel were available to fulfil a number of roles within the cell and there were some first-rate individual efforts with the recording of MCA assets deployed considered good and effective accounting procedures in place.

Good use was made of the Chevron liaison officer who had been deployed to Aberdeen MRCC at the start of the exercise, who later became a member of the MRC.

Discussion took place between the MRC and the Environment Group (EG) on the efficacy of dispersant spraying. The EG advice was not to apply dispersant as the exercise weather conditions meant dispersant spraying may be less effective. However, the MRC have the final say and decided to go ahead with a dispersant spraying strategy. There needs to be clarity on the responsibility for decision making and provision of suitable technical expertise to support the decision making.



(MCA Pollution Surveillance Aircraft)

Security access to Marine House was considered good with observers and media being properly managed.

### **Less Effective**

A pollution report (POLREP) was issued by MRCC Aberdeen on behalf of the Duty CPSO although the address list did not include Shetland Islands Council. Current HMCG procedures include local authorities in POLREP addresses for incidents within UK territorial waters (12 miles) and outside the 12 miles if likely to be affected.

It was unclear when the MRC was established. An official 'cell activated' notification was transmitted at 2.00pm but it became apparent that a number of other response cells thought it had been activated much earlier. This uncertainty may partially have been caused by exercise artificiality and primarily the pre positioning of the cell.

There did not appear to be a clear command and control structure. Agencies outside the MCA were confused as to the command and control structure within the MRC. This resulted in similar confusion in the identification of the roles and responsibilities within the team.

In some cases it was felt the role given to certain members of the cell was inappropriate and did not play to their strengths. This was due to the insufficient number of people available for the exercise.

The lack of command and control led many of the team members to work in isolation, on individual work streams and with little team focus. They worked as professional individuals rather than a team. Briefings were identified as being laborious and deflecting individual team members from their primary task.

At the outset there was a requirement to identify the main risk areas and actions, prioritise these actions and assign tasks to individuals within the group. Although this took place it was not deemed to be as effective as it could have been.

On day two the cell focused primarily on the additional questions presented by the Directing Staff to the players to the exclusion of the actual exercise development. This may have been due to a misunderstanding of the exercise requirements in transition from a real time exercise to an accelerated timeline. This was particularly relevant to the response to the proposal put before the SOSREP to remove the BOP, which would have resulted in a significant release of 88,000bbls oil per day into the environment.

The rationale for the MRC to sanction dispersant spraying and not take the advice provided by the EG was not recorded or disseminated – record keeping within the cell was patch and lacked the necessary formality.

Although a number of aerial assets were nominally deployed there was no formal communications plan to control these assets issued to other cells which led to assumptions being made with regards to the establishment of the Temporary Restrictions to Flying Regulations (TRFR) and its overall control. Other cells appeared to be unaware of the correct procedures which led to uncertainty for the operator when attempting to use the correct procedures to allow civilian helicopters to enter the area.

The Co-ordination Instructions prepared by the MCA describing the overall co-ordination of the at sea response appeared to have been compiled without consultation with the operator and resulted in uncertainty over roles and responsibilities. The term primacy was also used during a communication with the operator which perpetuated this uncertainty.

The Co-ordination Instruction document was forwarded by e-mail to Chevron AEMT by the MRC during the afternoon of day one. However this paper was never received

at Chevron AEMT. This was due to an incorrect e-mail address being used and a lack of formal message receipt procedures.

Due to the MCA IT security policy, cell members found it extremely difficult to share information effectively between themselves and with other responders. This has been an ongoing issue for a number of years, and despite being highlighted in a number of exercise reports, including Exercise Unicorn, is still to be resolved.

The dynamics of the room were considered poor with little use made of wall displays on day one.

### **Summary**

Due to a lack of overall command and control coupled with an unclear identification of individual roles and responsibilities the MRC did not function as designed. There was uncertainty on what role the MRC had assumed and what was expected of the operator in relation to the overall spill response. Individual members worked hard to accomplish an end result but appeared to receive little guidance or instruction.

## **10.8 Shetland Islands Council (SIC)**

### **Shoreline Response Centre (SRC) and Crisis Management Team (CMT)**

#### Overall Objectives for Shoreline Response Centre and Crisis Management Team

1. To exercise Shetland Islands Council Marine Pollution Plan in response to, a major oil spill event.
2. To exercise the interfaces between the Marine Pollution Plan and the National Contingency Plan.
3. To exercise multi-agency communications at the local level.
4. To identify the support required from Council Departments to a major oil spill event.

The evaluators considered that all objectives set by Shetland Island Council had been met.

#### **What Went Well**

##### Shoreline Response Centre - Management Team

Shetland Islands Council's initial actions were quickly taken as set out in their established response plans. SIC Crisis Management Team / Emergency Response Centre (CMT / ERC) were briefed on the developing situation. The available information indicated there was the potential for a Tier 2 incident to develop and pollution to impact on the Shetland Isles. The recommendation was to activate the Shoreline Response Centre (SRC) on the understanding it could be stood down if not required.

There was a clear understanding of the trigger points and SIC's roles and responsibilities at the various Tier levels. Early contact was made with partner organisations within the SRC to inform them that it was being established.

Initially information was recorded in personal notebooks of SRC members with a formal log keeper appointed when the alerting process was started.

Appropriate SRC sub groups were established which reported into the Management Group with additional representation / input being identified as the exercise scenario developed.

The SRC Chair clearly explained the roles and responsibilities of the Management Team and the SIC Strategic Team. The purpose of group and joint decision making was emphasised.

Following a discussion on the role of the Wildlife Rescue Coordination Centre it was agreed they should have a seat on the SRC Management Team.



(SRC Management Team)

Early discussion between SIC and Chevron identified the need for close liaison for the recording of spending and the interaction with media.

There were regular communications between the SRC, the Environment Group and SIC CMT/ERC.

Following the debrief at the end of day one, a number of actions were identified and followed up during day two. This led to better communications, information gathering, recording and sharing.

The integration of an operator's representative (liaison officer) within the SRC greatly assisted communications and allowed queries to be quickly dealt with.

Appropriate representation by additional properly trained liaison officers went some way to ensure better cross cell communications. This was evident in the presence of the Environment Group Liaison Officer and representatives from Sullom Voe Terminal.

A deputy for the SRC chair was identified on day two which worked extremely well as the Chair was absent on a couple of occasions (Press Conference and Cell Chair briefings). The deputy also briefed the SIC Strategic Group and this was an extremely effective use of resources.

### Technical Team

The Technical Team sub group established by the SRC Management Group worked well as a team and were proactive.

Meetings were well run with an appointed note taker and full contribution by all into the discussions. The team split itself into separate units to deal with specific topics (e.g. waste specialists).



(SRC Technical Team)

A better use of status boards and maps was made compared to the Management Team.

### Procurement Team

The Procurement Team sub group consisted of one person who channelled required information into the Management Team. This person was very clear on the need for accurate record keeping and that all financial matters should come through a single person.

The Technical and Procurement Team worked well and passed appropriate information into the Management Team.

### Crisis Management Team

When advised of the incident the correct response plans and triggers were accurately identified with reports and alerts being made as required within the plans.

The Crisis Management Team (CMT) was quickly established in the Council Chamber allowing good access to communications and video conference facilities.

Administrative support was identified within the response plan and staff attended as required.

An Executive Director, deputising for the Chief Executive, effectively chaired all of the meetings supported by the Emergency Controller.

Strong chairmanship resulted in a confidence boost to tactical level staff acting at the strategic level and good outcomes were obvious during meetings.

There is a standing draft agenda for SIC/ERC to use for any incident and this was successfully adapted, thus allowing a clear “pathway” to be identified and the correct allocation of tasks. It was felt that this gave the Strategic Chair time to reflect and confirm decisions taken at his meetings and to plan a way forward ensuring department contributions were included.

There was a clear identification of the business impact of the response with ongoing identification and resolution of demands. There was an ongoing risk assessment process with the inclusion of the Risk Manager as part of the ERC.

Experiences gained from the grounding of the M.T. Braer in 1993 were used to ensure quick identification of logistical and financial challenges and comprehensive planning was undertaken. Contact was quickly established with the offshore operator and lines of communication opened with their legal and finance departments.

Communications between the CMT and the SRC were good with both strategic and tactical responsibilities being identified. The Chief Executive was briefed on day one.

There was a constant review of the media strategy which was adjusted to meet the changing situation.

Good team work and leadership within the CMT was evident throughout the exercise with excellent support from the Emergency Controller. It was felt that this team working had a significant effect on the strategic response of the ERC.

As the cell had been established within the council buildings, security levels were business as usual. However it was fully understood that in a live incident there would have to be greater access controls.

Only the financial representative changed for day two. A good handover brief was observed and this was reinforced at the briefing given by the cell chairman.



(The Shetland Islands)

## **Less Effective**

### Shoreline Response Centre - Management Team

Although the SRC was quickly established with good representation from local organisations it was noted that the MCA representative was located in the Environment Group (EG) and therefore not easily accessible. A constant MCA presence within the Management Team would have been beneficial.

State boards were maintained for key actions though little additional information was displayed. This could prove challenging during shift changes etc.

There was uncertainty regarding the at sea response and what maritime actions were being undertaken. The operator's representative was asked to gather the information. This uncertainty could have been quickly alleviated had there been an MCA presence in the Management Team.

There was uncertainty on the role and responsibility of external cells, the main issue being minimal contact with the MRC. However there was more clarity on individual roles and responsibilities following the "Head of Cells" conference calls.

On day two, during a meeting of the SRC, it was felt that due to public health concerns a Scientific, Technical and Advisory Cell (STAC) would have been established. However as this was not an exercise objective it was not progressed further.

### Technical Team

Nothing identified.

### Procurement Team

It was clear that this team would have to be substantially enhanced during a real incident.

### Crisis Management Team

It was noted that many members of the CMT consisted of deputies and in some cases deputies of deputies. This required the Chair to fully explain everyone's role and responsibilities. On occasion the team adopted a more tactical approach to the incident rather than the required strategic approach. It was felt that this would not have been the case if the group had consisted predominately of the required strategic level personnel.

The CMT used a different facility on day two which had no video conference facility and limited teleconferencing due to normal ongoing council business being conducted in the original facility.

## **Summary**

### Shoreline Response Centre

The team was well led with an inclusive style of management being observed. There was an extremely active participation evident by all members during the exercise. Internal lessons learned following day one were applied to day two and worked well. Response strategies were identified with tactical and operational requirements developed. Communications with external response cells improved on day two but still required development. The 'Head of Cells' conference calls were considered useful.

### Shetland Islands Council Crisis Management Team

The response to the incident by Shetland Islands Council CMT / ERC was felt to be effective. The evaluator felt that the Chairman and Emergency Controller were excellent with meetings being held in a structured, controlled and methodical manner. This ensured that all parts of the strategic response and recovery essential to success were visited as thoroughly as required. However if it had not been for this strong leadership there was a concern that due to the tactical roles of those attending, the strategic response may not have been as focused as it was.

## 10.9 Sullom Voe Terminal (SVT), BP

### Overall Objectives

1. Test communications links between MRC, SRC and SVT.
2. Test Oil Spill Co-ordinator role becoming imbedded in SRC.
3. Deployment of suitable equipment (e.g. boom, skimmers) to identified locations as a first response.
4. Establish working relationships/communications on site with other responders (i.e. OSR, SIC, SRC).

It was considered that all objectives set by Sullom Voe (BP) were met.

### **What Went Well**

Sullom Voe Terminal is a key part of the overall Shetland Islands Council's emergency pollution response strategy. Due to the remote nature of the Shetland Isles, the Sullom Voe Terminal, under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), provide initial response expertise and equipment to the Council in the event of a Tier 2 pollution event.

During the exercise they provided operational advice to the Management Team of the Shoreline Response Centre.

During the exercise communications links between the SRC and SVT (BP) were tested and found to be good.

Liaison links between the SVT and the SRC worked well with suitable representation within the SRC.

On site communications worked well with other responders although equipment deployed was limited due to the prevailing weather conditions.

### **Less Effective Areas**

Nothing identified.

### **Summary**

The support links between Shetland Island's Council and Sullom Voe Terminal (BP) are well established and work well.

## 10.10 Oil Spill Response (OSR)

### Overall Objectives

1. Test the mobilisation process and interface with Chevron Upstream Europe.
2. Locate personnel into Chevron control centre to familiarise them with the activities and processes.
3. Utilise the Hercules and ADDS Pack spray system in support of dispersant operations.
4. Utilise the RVL aircraft for spray and surveillance missions and/or spill analysis.
5. Assess dispersant re-supply options.
6. Assess dispersant effectiveness monitoring.
7. Subsea dispersant application procedures and protocols.
8. Implementation of SCAT process to enable priorities to be detailed and plans to be put in place for treatment.

The evaluators considered that six of the objectives the majority of objectives set by Oil Spill Response had been fully met (2-7), one partially met (1) and one not met (8).

1 - Assess dispersant effectiveness monitoring was not fully met due to a full monitoring programme using fluorometry not established due the prolonged discussions on the suitability of dispersant use.

8 - Implementation of SCAT (Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Techniques) process to enable priorities to be detailed and plans to be put in place for treatment was not met because although the issue was noted as being relevant, OSR were not involved in this aspect of the response.

### **What Went Well**

The initial alert carried out by Chevron and subsequent response procedures applicable to OSR were good. Initial response levels were agreed with Chevron and the correct triggers identified and actioned.

OSR Operations Room in Southampton was manned and fully resourced according to existing procedures.

There are well established procedures for representatives from OSR to integrate into the operator's response mechanism, and as OSR are Chevron's Tier 2/3 contractors this was done quickly with their technical expertise being made available to the operator. An appropriate aerial response was quickly identified and mobilised.

Generic risk assessments for response assets already existed and these were developed to be site specific.

In anticipation of spraying operations commencing, full logistical dispersant and re supply procedures were developed and forwarded to both the Chevron AEMT and the MRC.

Aerial response observation / assessment downlinks were tested and proved to work well. This exercise information was distributed as per standard operating procedures.



(Chevron / OSR response Team)

An at sea response strategy was requested towards the end of day one. A sea surface co coordinator from Briggs Environmental Services Ltd (BESL) was established within the MRC and local command passed to the MRC.

Full logistical and financial tracking of OSR resources was undertaken using existing, well tested, procedures.

Internal communications within OSR and the operator were considered good.

Overall it was felt that the OSR teams were well led with team meetings being effective.

### **Less Effective**

The role and responsibility of OSR was fully understood during the initial stages of the incident but became less clear following the establishment of the MRC.

It was felt there was a lack of clarity as to when the incident was escalated to a Tier 3 event and, particularly, when the MRC was officially established.

Whilst the recording of information was considered good at the OSR Operations Room in Southampton, a lack of charts, maps and status sheets available to the team based at Chevron House presented challenges as information could not be visually displayed around the room.



(OSR Response Equipment in Shetland)

An appropriate aerial response was quickly identified and mobilised. However there was some uncertainty over aerial spraying options as there appeared to be doubt over regulatory approval procedures.

Communications between the MRC and OSR were considered poor and lacked clarity. It was also felt that communication to and from the SRC was limited.

### **Summary**

Overall the response by OSR as the operators Tier 2/3 contractor was consistent with standard operating procedures. They were quickly incorporated into the operators command and control system and provided both technical and operational advice and support. Equipment was mobilised and short, medium and long term response requirements identified. However there was a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities following the activation of the National Contingency Plan and the establishment of the MRC.

## 10.11 Environment Group (EG)

### Overall Objectives

1. To exercise the setting up of an 'Offshore' Environment Group in the Shetland Islands to advise national response units that may be on the mainland.
2. To exercise liaison between the Environment Group and national response units.
3. To further develop the roles and responsibilities of the Environment Group.

The evaluators considered that all objectives set by the Environment Group had been met

### **What Went Well**

The establishment of the Environment Group was requested by the SOSREP and actioned through the function of the MCA Duty CPSO. The initial alerting procedures for Marine Scotland (MS) worked well and subsequently all appropriate environmental organisations were informed in a timely manner. These included Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and DECC. The Scottish Government was also informed by Marine Scotland.

The other response cells were informed that the EG had been established during the early stages of the exercise although no official notification of activation was issued until late on day one.

The recording of the initial information was considered good with flipcharts and information technology being used creatively. An iGoogle account was created for use by all members of the EG.

Oil spill modelling was requested from the MCA and this was supplied to the EG within thirty minutes. As the oil was predicted to impact upon the Northern Isles this was seen as an appropriate trigger and the EG was formally called. Key personnel were identified and informed of its establishment.

Sensitivity maps were available and an offshore environmental impact assessment conducted with the impact at this stage being assessed as low. This assessment was an ongoing process throughout the exercise. High priority protection areas were also identified and reviewed throughout the exercise as was the public health threat.

Environmental Liaison Officers for the SRC, MRC and OCU were quickly identified.



(Environment Group)

The meetings of the EG on day one were chaired by Marine Scotland (MS) and individual roles and responsibilities were fully explained. It was commented that there was an excellent overall style of chairmanship, being highly effective and calm. There was a good delegation of responsibilities which played to individual's strengths. This effective leadership continued into day two when the chair was assumed by SNH.

Requests for information from the EG on day one were limited and it was felt decisions were being made without proper EG consultation. Towards the end of day one the various liaison officers were instructed to become more pro-active when dealing with other cells and to highlight areas where environmental consultation was needed and desired. There was a much improved communication flow with all the cells on day two following this decision. It was appreciated that if the incident had been for real this pro-active approach would have happened much earlier.

Involvement of Shetland Islands Council helped to ensure good information flow and advice to the SRC and SIC CMT / ERC. Contact with the local aquaculture industry, offshore and inshore fishing industries through well established links enabled them to seek proper advice and make their own commercial decisions.

Overall communications within the EG were good with a practical application of technology. There was limited communications with other cells on day one but this was much improved on day two with a more pro-active involvement of liaison officers and approach of the EG.

Good use was made of face to face discussions and conference call facilities on day two which helped ensure the guidance was fully understood. The importance of ensuring that the receipt and understanding of important e-mail messages is confirmed by telephone call was highlighted on a number of occasions by the EG.



(The common puffin - Fratercula arctica – in Shetland)

Good records were maintained and various briefing notes prepared for the SRC Management Team.

### **Less Effective**

EG response cell location was considered cramped although this may have been down to the limited available accommodation at Shetland Islands Council Sella Ness Offices.

It was felt that the MRC was slow to request an Environmental Liaison Officer (ELO), despite being encouraged to do so during the early stages of the incident and again midway through day one. It was noted that communications with the MRC appeared unclear and may have been due to the lack of an ELO. An ELO within the MRC was established at around lunchtime on day one and communications are recorded as being better on day two.

Day one was taken up with a great deal of debate on what approvals were required before subsea and surface dispersant application(s) could be conducted. There appeared to be a great deal of uncertainty within some of the other response cells as to the EG's role in this area. The EG were quite clear on policy but it took some time for the other cells to clearly understand and appreciate the guidance being given.

### **Summary**

The Environment Group was effectively led by Marine Scotland with full input from the other organisations represented. Initially communications with the other cells and liaison officers was poor although this improved significantly on day two following a more pro active approach by the EG. There was a great deal of uncertainty outside the EG around the issue of dispersant spraying and what approvals were required. It was also felt that some of the other cells were slow in fully engaging with the EG and obtaining advice.

## 10.12 Media Response

### **MCA Press Office**

#### Overall Objectives

1. To exercise the media response and co-ordination with other government departments, external agencies and stakeholders.
2. Test media support arrangements, mobilisation to remote locations including logistics, in supporting a significant influx of media to such a location.
3. To address recommendation from Exercise Unicorn to conduct a media exercise which involves setting up a media briefing centre.

### **DECC Press Office**

#### Overall Objectives

1. To exercise the media response and co-ordination with other government departments, external agencies and stakeholders.
2. Test the integration with the MCA media team.

The evaluators considered that all objectives set by MCA and DECC were met.

### **What Went Well**

The main media response cell was established in Chevron House and consisted of representatives from Chevron, DECC and the MCA. There was also a media responder co-located with the Marine Response Centre at Aberdeen MRCC. Response members were pre-positioned.

As response members were also dealing with real press enquiries regarding the exercise, a pre prepared list of questions and answers assisted greatly in both live and exercise press enquiries.

The MCA took the lead as the government media responder with DECC acting in support and providing briefings to Ministers. Both organisations worked closely with the Chevron media team to ensure the exercise media were presented with a common and accurate picture.

The role playing journalists reported they were pleased with the access they had to the media representatives from Chevron, MCA, DECC, Shetland Islands Council and the Scottish Government. The journalists were in regular contact throughout the day with those media representatives and were updated with comments and sent statements by email.



(Media filming boom deployment in Shetland)

As well as making telephone calls, the broadcast media journalist conducted radio and television interviews with key members of the Chevron management team.

### **Less Effective**

It was recognised that the limited number of role play journalists could not replicate the volume of calls or wide range of questions which would be generated if the incident was for real. It was also noted that their main focus was on Chevron and other agencies were placed under only slight pressure.

It was noted that due to delays within email systems the ten minute rule, which is an agreed procedure where all organisations are shown other organisations' statements before issue and have ten minutes in which to respond, could not always be achieved.

Chevron issued a holding statement at 10.02am and the MCA issued a news release at 10.30am. The initial Chevron press release was not issued until 11.50am. This led to some difficulty for the Chevron response team as they were being queried about the safety of the 154 persons onboard as quoted within the MCA news release.

An exercise press conference was held at the end of day one with the SOSREP and representatives from both Chevron and MCA. An identified chairperson for the press conference could have aided in managing questions and drawing the session to a close.

It was highlighted that all media representatives need to be co-located in one room.

## **Summary**

The coordinated media response between the MCA, DECC and Chevron was considered a success. Much of this success was down to the good working relationship established between the various groups in preparation for the live media interest the exercise was expected to generate, and the agreement of working relationships and responsibilities pre exercise. However the exercise media pressure was limited to the operator, and other agencies should be aware of the unprecedented media coverage such an incident would normally attract, and not become complacent.

## **10.13 Health and Safety Executive (HSE)**

### Overall Objectives

1. To respond to the exercise, on a basis of good endeavours, in line with HSE's major incident and investigations procedures and provide, when requested, advice on health and safety matters.
2. To test the fitness for purpose of HSE's procedures, competency of HSE responders and make any necessary changes to improve the HSE's efficiency and effectiveness.
3. To contribute towards an improved understanding and good working arrangements between all stakeholders.

### **Summary**

As the exercise was essentially a pollution response exercise the opportunity to fully test their response procedures was limited. However notification of the incident was received through agreed procedures and disseminated internally. It was felt that the exercise proved a useful test of these notification procedures.

## Appendix A – Recommendations

**These recommendations should be read in conjunction with the overall report and not in isolation.**

No.	Lesson Identified	Recommendation	To be completed by the recommendations group	
			Suggested Owner*	Target Date
1	Upon completion of the previous offshore national exercise (Exercise Unicorn) it was recommended that a small team be set up to monitor the outcome of each recommendation identified at the end of the exercise.	A small group is formed to monitor organisations progress on recommendations identified following Exercise SULA. This group should also act as advisors during the rewrite of the NCP.	MCA/DECC	
2	Exercise SULA has reinforced the need for the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to undergo a complete review.	Where appropriate, the recommendations and observations within this report be considered for incorporation within the NCP.	MCA	
3	The MRC appeared to be unclear as to its overall role and function. This resulted in uncertainty over the roles, responsibilities and expectations of both the MRC and the Operator.	MCA should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the operator and MRC/MCA during pollution incidents involving the offshore oil and gas industry and how these will be communicated.	MCA	
4	Due to the limited number of times an MRC is established it is vital to ensure that sufficient personnel are properly prepared and trained to both attend and lead. Staff at all levels within response cells need to be familiar with their expected roles and responsibilities.	<p>The MRC should be exercised again within six months of this report, and then at least once per year.</p> <p>It is recommended that an offshore oil and gas operator should be involved biennially.</p> <p><i>(Similar recommendation produced within the Exercise Unicorn report).</i></p>	MCA	

5	Some MCA staff within the MRC and OCU relied upon their own IT communications equipment due to agency IT restrictions or not having been issued with suitable 3G compatible ICT equipment.	MCA Counter Pollution Response Branch to conduct a full assessment of the emergency response and on call IT equipment requirements for all MCA members of pollution response cells.  The necessary ICT capability should be provided.  <i>(Similar recommendation produced within the Exercise Unicorn report).</i>	MCA	
6	Although guidance and policy statements exist there was a great deal of discussion around dispersant application during day one of the exercise and an uncertainty over the process outside the Environment Group.	A UK policy / position paper be produced by the environmental regulators and distributed to the offshore oil and gas industry.	MS/MMO	
7	Waste management during any pollution incident presents a number of challenges and although incorporated within Exercise SULA it was realised during the early stages of the exercise planning that it would require greater focus than that which could be provided during the exercise.	The oil and gas industry, in consultation with the appropriate environmental regulators should ensure that there are suitable sufficient arrangements in place to deal with reception, storage, treatment and final disposal of the types and quantities of waste that can be anticipated responding to a major pollution incident.	To be Agreed	
8	During the lead up to Exercise SULA an extensive Media Communications Plan was developed.	The document should be reviewed in conjunction with other stakeholders and used as a template for future Media Communications Plans.	MCA	
9	The MCA were unable to meet one of their objectives due to the lack of a pollution response MOU with the Faroese authorities.	MOU covering pollution response procedures be developed with the Faroese authorities.	MCA	
10	The lack of correlation between the NCP and the Civil Contingency Act was highlighted by a number of exercise stakeholders both during the planning stages and the exercise.	This should be addressed during the forthcoming NCP review and thereafter a tabletop exercise should take place to test the outcome(s).	MCA	

11	The offshore oil and gas industry conduct a number of exercises every year which identify a number of learning's and good practice. It is essential that these are fully captured outside individual operators.	That the working groups established following the final OSPRAG report develop a mechanism to capture and disseminate lessons learned and good practices.	Oil & Gas UK	
12	The Heads of Cell conference calls allowed strategic overview discussions to take place between key participants.	Consider development of high level communications protocol to enable future strategic overview discussion between Heads of Cells.	MCA	
13	A number of challenges had to be overcome and a strategic refocus undertaken during the planning of Exercise SULA	Planning for future National Contingency Plan Exercises should ensure that the format and composition of the planning team and final contributors are formally agreed.	MCA	

*\* A recommendation monitoring group is to be established to oversee the outcome of the recommendations listed above. Once the recommendations have been assigned to specific groups / individuals, and confirmed, and target dates have been established, this section of the report will be updated.*

## Appendix B – Observations and Best Practice

During the exercise a number of observations were made by the evaluation team and exercise participants. Organisations are encouraged to review these observations and consider if they are applicable to their own response teams.

<b>Observations and Best Practice</b>	
1	During the exercise it was felt that some of the liaison officers were unclear in their overall role and responsibility.
2	<p>Comment was made on the focused and well practiced approach to the administration of the OCU and it was felt that, where appropriate, other response cells should consider.</p> <p><i>(It should be noted that this team are involved in an exercise with the offshore oil and gas industry approximately every 6 – 8 weeks.)</i></p>
3	During the exercise some evaluators and players highlighted the additional response assets which an offshore operator could quickly deploy, compared with the resources immediately available to a ship owner. It was suggested that consideration could be given to having a separate section within the NCP specific to the offshore oil and gas industry.
4	One of the recommendations from Exercise Unicorn was that cells should officially announce their establishment. This was not completed by all cells on the day even though a template had been distributed. It was felt that had all cells utilised the template some of the initial communications difficulties may have been avoided.
5	During the exercise the operator requested information on the regulatory requirements for the activities they were proposing in response to the incident. (e.g. discharge of water from recovery vessels removed from recovered/skimmed oil, set-up of vessel decontamination area etc). In some cases this took time to identify. It was felt that some pre prepared guidance would have been helpful.

6	<p>The full impact of the Deepwater Horizon incident is still being determined yet any pollution incident has the potential to have an extensive social and economic impact. The public need to be assured that all reasonable claims are covered. To allow this reassurance the prospective operator needs to be able to reassure the regulator that sufficient funds / insurance exists to meet response requirements.</p> <p>During Exercise SULA the following were identified as being good practice;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of an independent expert to oversee / determine longer term difficult claims in dispute;</li> <li>• Running of table top exercises to examine claims handling, liability and insurance provisions; and</li> <li>• Use of independent verification of insurance / joint operating agreements terms and conditions to provide confirmation to the regulator of sufficient insurance provision and allow for strict liability response</li> </ul>
7	<p>The use of deputies and deputies of deputies, was noted particularly within the SIC ERT. Whilst this allows managers the opportunity to operate at the higher level it does not fully allow senior managers the opportunity to identify and participate in self development training. Deputies should be conscious / aware of having to step up in the management structure in the event of absences of higher level staff.</p>
8	<p>Several exercise players commented on the apparent detached location of the MRC with regards the operator. Whilst co-location would ease communications it is appreciated that not all operators would have suitable facilities to allow this to happen.</p>
9	<p>MCA STOp Notice 3/2009 refers to a matrix of issues but if this is referred to as a Risk Register then it could be something more easily understood by local authorities.</p>
10	<p>Many response cells do not have pre-identified locations. They need to be self sufficient during the initial stages of an incident and this includes a method for displaying strategic, tactical and operational information in a format easily accessible to other cell members. This format could include, but not be limited to, pre prepared wall boards.</p>
11	<p>It was unclear what aerial and surface communications plans had been developed to co-ordinate response units. Guidance on how to develop and implement these communications plans by the controlling authority would have removed much of this uncertainty.</p>
12	<p>The building access security procedures adopted by Chevron mirrored those used during the Deepwater Horizon incident and provided a secure working area for those response cells based in Chevron House.</p>

13	Both in-situ burning and the application of subsea dispersants were response tools used during the Deepwater Horizon incident. The effectiveness of utilising such tools during an incident within the UKCS is being considered by the regulatory authorities along with Oil and Gas UK.
14	All organisations should ensure that they have adequate response capabilities to be able to respond to an extended incident (human resource with adequate familiarity in response protocols or ability to contract in resources).
15	Operators should ensure that a strategy has been prepared to transition from pre identified emergency response rooms to larger facilities as the incident develops and response capabilities increase.
16	Operators should consider pre-developing well control response strategies to aid in the progression of well control response plans.

## Appendix C - Glossary

ADDS	Airborne Dispersant Delivery System
AEMT	Asset Emergency Management Team (Chevron)
ARCC	Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RAF Kinloss)
ATCC	Air Traffic Control Centre
BESL	Briggs Environmental Services Ltd
BOP	Blow Out Preventor
BOPD	Barrels of Oil Per Day
BST	British Summer Time
CMT	Crisis Management Team
CPSO	Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer
CUE	Chevron Upstream Europe
DECC	Department of Energy and Climate Change
DfT	Department for Transport
EG	Environment Group
ELO	Environment Liaison Officer
ENDEX	End of Exercise notice
EOM	Emergency Operations Manager
ERC	Emergency Response Centre
ERR	Emergency Response Room
ERT	Emergency Response Team
H&S	Health and Safety
HMCG	Her Majesty's Coastguard
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite Organisation
JNCC	Joint Nature Conservation Committee
LMRP	Lower Marine Riser Package
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Met Office	Meteorological Office
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRC	Marine Response Centre, MCA
MRCC	Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (HMCG)
MS	Marine Scotland – Marine Laboratory
NCP	National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations
NEBA	Net Environmental Benefit Analysis
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NHS	National Health Service
NORBRIT	Norway-United Kingdom Joint Contingency Plan
OCU	Operations Control Unit
OIM	Offshore Installation Manager
OPEP	Oil Pollution Emergency Plan
OPOL	Offshore Pollution Liability Association
OSR	Oil Spill Response

PR	Public Relations
RVL	Reconnaissance Ventures Limited
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCAT	Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Technique
SCU	Salvage Control Unit
SEPA	Scottish Environment Protection Agency
SIC	Shetland Islands Council
SNH	Scottish Natural Heritage
ScoRDS	Scottish Resilience Development Service
SOSREP	Secretary of State's Representative for Maritime Salvage and Intervention
SRC	Shoreline Response Centre
STAC	Scientific, Technical and Advisory Cell
START EX	Start of Exercise
SVT	Sullom Voe Oil Terminal (BP)
TEZ	Temporary Exclusion Zone
TRFR	Temporary Restriction of Flying Regulations
TVDSS	True Vertical Depth Subsea
UKCS	United Kingdom Continental Shelf
WRCC	Wildlife Rescue Co ordination Centre

## Appendix D – Exercise Planning Brief

Initial planning for the exercise commenced in August 2010 with a general scoping meeting. A stakeholders meeting was held in November 2010 and following a strategic refocus specific planning commenced in January 2011.

As previously stated Exercise SULA was unique in its attempt to incorporate a significant and on-going deepwater drilling incident resulting in a shoreline impact and involving all key Government and commercial response organisations.


In order to achieve the full initial response and threaten the shoreline of the Shetland Isles the exercise development team decided to run the exercise spanning two days but with day two progressing five days in the response timeline. It was also decided at a very early stage that there should be no requirement for Search and Rescue activity, and also at a later stage to avoid any salvage element. It was felt this would ensure a complete focus on the pollution response aim of the exercise.

The “time jump” produced significant challenges for the development team as the players would have expected certain significant actions to have been undertaken between day one and day six. These had to be identified and suitable answers provided to the players prior to the commencement of day two (day six in the timeline).

An additional challenge was identifying the right environmental exercise conditions to ensure the pollution threatened the Shetland Isles. This in itself raised some issues on the day with regards to the application of dispersants.

In order to achieve a realistic “time jump” a number of ad hoc members were invited to planning meetings to supplement the expertise and knowledge of the core planning team. It was felt that this combined effort allowed a realistic scenario to be developed for day one and identification of the “expected” actions taken between day one and day ‘six’.

Following the initial incident day one was expected to progress live with no injects required.



(Exercise planning team members – Chevron House)

Prior to the commencement of day two (day six in the timeline) each team was given a briefing on what had happened over the previous five days. Where possible this briefing was also used to answer questions raised by the players. Each cell was then given a number of questions to consider during day two with the focus being on the logistical challenges which would be faced during a prolonged pollution incident.

In order to further replicate a Gulf of Mexico style incident an inject was made to the SOSREP by Chevron. Following a technical review it had been identified that there was the potential to replace the BOP. This would initially require the removal of the existing BOP and would result in an ongoing release of up to 88,000bbls of oil per day for two to three days. The SOSREP was requested to consider Chevron's proposal and inform the other cells of the potential for an increase in the release rate thus allowing them to review strategies and identify potential logistical shortfalls. The SOSREP also requested environmental advice from the Environmental Group.

Unfortunately due to communications problems already described within the main report, this information did not reach the MRC within the desired time scale and even then, was not fully appreciated by the cell. The MRC had become focused on the questions posed at the start of day two to the exclusion of the exercise itself.

However this did not adversely affect the exercise as all other response cells reacted accordingly.

The overall planning process was relatively short and required a great deal of time and input from a large number of people. Although this is not a full analysis of the planning procedure the following comments have been made:

- identification and agreement of budgets should have occurred at the earliest opportunity;
- given hindsight the move from day one to day 'six' would have been better managed with more detailed information available;
- the identification of Exercise Sponsors and Directors should have occurred at the initial scoping meeting;
- individual roles and responsibilities within the exercise development team should have been identified and agreed much earlier;
- although the stakeholder meetings were considered as being beneficial it was felt that their aims and objectives were not robust enough;
- the participation of players in the planning process must be avoided; and
- close monitoring of the potential impact the exercise artificiality could have on the thought processes of cells, and their subsequent interaction, is required.

## Appendix E – Exercise Planning Team

Name	Role / Title	Organisation
Murray Milligan	Exercise Director (Chair) Regional Resilience Co-ordinator	MCA
Michael Reid	Exercise Director DECC Senior Investigation Officer	DECC
Colin Mulvana	Exercise Director Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer	MCA
Bernie Bennett	Exercise Controller Consultant	Morlich Services Ltd
Derek Moore	Exercise Controller Marine Science	Marine Scotland
John Taylor	Exercise Controller Emergency Planning & Resilience Manager	Shetland Islands Council
Jim Dickson	Exercise Lead Evaluator and report author. Deputy to the SOSREP	DECC / MCA
Ken Gillan	Exercise Controller OIM, Captain WPP / BLP	Chevron (CUE)
Stuart Gair	Exercise Controller Deputy Head of Operations	Oil Spill Response
Zoe Beverley	Operations Consultant	Oil Spill Response
Andy Lang	Exercise Consultant Team Leader	Petrofac Training Ltd
Brian Kinkead	Supply Chain Director	Oil and Gas UK
Dominic Stevens	Exercise Secretariat SOSREP Support Officer	MCA

### Additional Ad hoc / Co-opted Members

<b>Name</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
Wendy Kennedy	Head, Offshore Environment and Decommissioning Unit	DECC
Gail Robertson	Counter Pollution Resource and Claims Lead	MCA
Simon Valentine	Operations Manager	Braemar Howells
Peter Oliver	Chevron Environmental Team Leader	Chevron (CUE)
David Shrand	Offshore Consultant	Expro
Sarah Pritchard	Head, Offshore Environmental Unit	DECC
Dougie MacDonald	Head, Environmental and Emergency Response Standards	MCA
Stephen Fraser	Offshore Environmental Inspector	DECC
Muriel Roberts	Public and Government Affairs Manager	Chevron (CUE)
Dave Salt	Operations Director	OSR
Neville Davis	Rescue Centre Manager	MCA
Maggie Hill	Head of Communications	MCA

## Appendix F – Planning Meetings

Date	Meeting
17.08.2011	Initial scoping and planning meeting ( <i>No formal minutes</i> ).
30.09.2010	Scenario development and participant identification meeting.
29.11.2010	Exercise development meeting ( <i>No formal minutes</i> ).
30.11.2010	Stakeholders meeting.
12.01.2011	Exercise development meeting.
09.02.2011	Exercise development meeting.
10.02.2011	Exercise stakeholders meeting.
28.02.2011	Exercise 6 day development meeting ( <i>No formal agenda or minutes</i> ).
08.03.2011	Exercise development meeting.
05.04.2011	Exercise development meeting.
05.05.2011	Evaluators briefing.
10.05.2011	Exercise development meeting.
16.05.2011	Evaluators and Controllers briefing.
24.05.2011	Evaluators de brief.
07.06.2011	Exercise SULA wash up.

## Appendix G – Exercise SULA Evaluators

Name	Title	Cell Evaluated
Jim Dickson	Deputy to the Secretary of State's Representative	Evaluation Co-ordinator
Claire Vincent	Principal Scientific Officer within the Environmental Protection Directorate of Northern Ireland Environment Agency	Environment Group
Margaret Walters MBE	Emergency Planning, Civil Contingencies and Business Continuity Orkney Islands Council	Shetland Islands Council Crisis Management Team
Craig Bunyan	Senior Environmental Inspector, Department Of Energy and Climate Change	DECC response and Operations Control Unit
Doug Allsop	Media Consultant with Mearns and Gill	Media cell
Donna McLean	Emergency Planning Officer with Grampian Emergency Planning Unit	Shetland Islands Council Shoreline Response Centre
Cam Pulham	Duty Manager and Response Manager, Oil Spill Response	Oil Spill Response, Southampton
Dave Salt	Operations Manager, Oil Spill Response	Oil Spill Response, Aberdeen
Pete Thomson	Offshore Energy Liaison Officer, Maritime and Coastguard Agency	Chevron Asset Emergency Management Team
Ian Burgess	Coastal Safety Manager (North of Scotland), Maritime and Coastguard Agency	Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Marine Response Centre
Graham Baxter	Head, Emergency Response (Technical), Shell Upstream International Europe	Chevron Technical Support Group
Sarah Pritchard	Head, Offshore Environmental Unit, Department Of Energy and Climate Change	Chevron Legal and Financial Team